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I.

INTRODUCTION

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution' and article I, section 9, of the Alaska Constitution 2 guarantee all persons the
privilege against self-incrimination. Invocation of the privilege does
not, however, wholly exempt a person from having to provide selfincriminating testimony. It has long been understood that testimony
can be compelled if the witness is granted some form of immunity
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1. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
2. Article I, section 9, of the Alaska Constitution provides:
No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. No person
shall be compelled in any criminal proceeding to be a witness against
himself.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9.
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from prosecution. 3 Only the issue of the scope of immunity sufficient
to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege against self-incrimi5
4
nation remains unsettled. Although the federal courts, Congress,
state courts, 6 and state legislatures 7 have grappled with the issue of the
proper scope of immunity for nearly two centuries, controversy over
this important constitutional question persists.
Two different general means of compelling testimony by immu-

nizing witnesses from prosecution are currently utilized: (1) transactional immunity and (2) use and derivative use immunity.8
Transactional immunity absolutely precludes prosecution of a witness
for crimes referred to in the compelled testimony. 9 In contrast, use
and derivative use immunity prohibits only the use of the compelled

testimony and all evidence derived therefrom in future criminal pro-

ceedings against the witness.10 Thus, use and derivative use immunity
permits prosecution of the witness for crimes referred to in the com3. See infra sections III & IV.
4. See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
5. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 201(a),
84 Stat. 926, 927 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982)); Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 216,
repealed by Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 227(a), 84
Stat. 930; Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443, repealed by Act of Oct. 17, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(b), (c), 92 Stat. 1466; Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37
(declared unconstitutional in Counselman, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)); Act of Jan. 24, 1857,
ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155, amended by Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333 (indirectly
declared unconstitutional as in Counselman, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)).
6. See, e.g., State v. Miyasaki, 62 Haw. 269, 614 P.2d 915 (1980); Attorney General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 444 N.E.2d 915 (1982); State v. Soriano, 68 Or. App.
642, 684 P.2d 1220, aff'd, 298 Or. 392, 693 P.2d 26 (1984).
7. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.50.101 (1984); HAw. REV. STAT. § 621C
(Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 136.617, 136.619 (1981) (repealed 1983).
8. In the nineteenth century, a third form of immunity, namely use immunity,
was recognized. Use immunity precludes only the actual use of compelled testimony.
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449-50 (1972). Under a grant of use
immunity, evidence derived from the compelled testimony may be used in a subsequent prosecution against the witness. See id. This form of immunity was declared
unconstitutional in 1892. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); see infra
notes 46-49 and accompanying text. Since that time it has been clearly understood
that mere use immunity is insufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. In light of the fact that present-day courts regard this
form of immunity as per se unconstitutional, this article does not treat use immunity
as a viable means of compelling testimony.
9. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). In order to qualify for
immunity, the testimony must be given in response to a question rather than volunteered in an effort to frustrate and prevent prosecution. Surina v. Buckalew, 629 P.2d
969, 971-72 (Alaska 1981).
10. Surina, 629 P.2d at 971 n.2.
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pelled testimony if the prosecution is based entirely on independently
obtained evidence."I
Until 1972, when the Supreme Court upheld a federal use and
derivative use immunity statute in Kastigarv. United States,12 virtually
every court that considered the issue of the compulsion of testimony
favored transactional immunity. 13 It appears that most courts interpreted the Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock 14 as finding only transactional immunity constitutional. Since
Kastigar,the Alaska Supreme Court has had several opportunities to
take sides in the debate over the grant of immunity constitutionally

required to compel testimony. On each such occasion, the court has
expressed a preference for transactional immunity, but
has carefully
15

avoided resolving the issue on constitutional grounds.

Despite the expressed preference of the Alaska Supreme Court,
the Alaska legislature has enacted a standard use and derivative use
11. Id.
12. 406 U.S. 441, 448. The current version of the statute upheld is found at 18
U.S.C. § 6002 (1982) and reads:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-(l) a court or grand jury of the United States, (2) an agency of
the United States, or (3) either House of Congress,... and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under
this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or other information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1971) (only transactional immunity provides adequate constitutional basis for compelling appellant to
testify in light of fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination), rev'd, 406 U.S.
952 (1972); United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971) (transactional
immunity is constitutionally required as to the questioning sovereign), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 992 (1972); In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971) (once fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination asserted, transactional immunity must be accorded before grand jury witness can be compelled to testify), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952
(1972); United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1970) (use immunity
is not sufficiently comprehensive to justify use of coercive measure in order to compel
appellant to testify after he had claimed his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(transactional immunity is constitutionally mandated when testimony is compelled).
See also In re Reynolds, 449 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1971) (court ordered full transactional immunity for Reynolds after she asserted her fifth amendment right against selfincrimination), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972); In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.
1971) (granting transactional immunity). But see In re Desaulnier, 360 Mass. 769,
279 N.E.2d 287 (1971) (denying right to transactional immunity).
14. 142 U.S. 547 (1892); see infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
15. See infra section IV(B).
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immunity statute at the behest of the Alaska Department of Law. 16
This article considers the Alaska Supreme Court's voice in the constitutional dialogue on witness immunity and concludes that the court
will likely hold Alaska's new use and derivative use immunity statute
unconstitutional under article I, section 9, of the Alaska Constitution. 17 A contrary result would be inconsistent with the history of the
privilege against self-incrimination, the conceptualization of the privilege that existed in the minds of the framers of the Alaska Constitution, and the judicial policies that provided the analytical basis for a
number of important Alaska Supreme Court decisions.
Section II of this article analyzes the historical development of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Section III reviews the history
and development of testimonial immunity on the federal level. Section
IV examines the development of the law of immunity in Alaska. Finally, Section V advances the argument that the Alaska use and derivative use immunity statute should be struck as contrary to the Alaska
Constitution.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN PRIVILEGE AGAINST

SELF-INCRIMINATION

The notion of a privilege against self-incrimination is of ancient
origin. 18 References to it may be found in Biblical literature and Talmudic law. For example, the Talmud contains the rule "ein adam
meissim atsmo rasha," which translated literally means "a man cannot
represent himself as guilty, or as a transgressor," or figuratively, "no
one can incriminate himself."' 9 Notably, the rule was absolute - it
20
could not be waived or relinquished.
The modem formulation of the privilege emerged as a rejection of
the oath ex officio, which was an inquisitorial oath used by the English
ecclesiastical courts, the Court of the Star Chamber, and the High
Commission to force individuals to accuse themselves under penalty of
16. ALASKA STAT. § 12.50.101 (1984).

17. Three other states have rejected similar statutes on state constitutional
grounds. See State v. Miyasaki, 62 Haw. 269, 614 P.2d 915 (1980) (declaring unconstitutional HAW. REV. STAT. § 621C (Supp. 1984)); Attorney General v. Colleton,
387 Mass. 790, 444 N.E.2d 915 (1982) (declaring that MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A,

§ 6(7) (Law. Co-op. 1985) was not coextensive with the state privilege against selfincrimination because it failed to provide for transactional immunity); State v. Soriano, 68 Or. App. 642, 684 P.2d 1220 (1984) (declaring unconstitutional OR. REV.

STAT. § 136.619 (1981) (repealed 1983)).
18. See THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, (I. Epstein, ed., Soncino Edition 1935); L.
LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); Horowitz, The PrivilegeAgainst
Self-Incrimination: How Did it Originate?, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 121 (1958).
19. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 18, at Sanhedrin 96; L. LEVY, supra
note 18, at 434; Horowitz, supra note 18, at 125-27.
20. L. LEVY, supra note 18, at 434.
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contempt or perjury. 2 1 By the end of the seventeenth century, the
privilege against self-incrimination was firmly established as a rule of
evidence in English common law courts. 22 Basically, the privilege was
intended to make the administration of criminal justice more humane. 23 The establishment of the privilege reflected the precepts that
society benefits by obtaining convictions without the aid of involuntary admissions, 24 that an accused is innocent until proven guilty, that
the burden of proof justifiably rests on the prosecution, and that a person's home should not be forcefully entered and searched for evidence
of his reading and writing. 25 In sum, the privilege grew out of the
belief that any cruelty or coercion, however subtle, in forcing a person
26
to expose his own thoughts and guilts was unfair and illegal.
One of the instrumental events in the evolution of the privilege
against self-incrimination occurred late in 1637 when marshals of the
English High Commission arrested "Freeborn John" Lilburne, a
young Puritan, on charges of shipping seditious books into England
from Holland. 27 Lilburne denied the charge and refused to answer
questions that he feared could provide the basis for other charges
against him. After Lilburne spent nearly two weeks in jail, the King's
attorney summoned Lilburne to the Court of Star Chamber and demanded that he take the oath ex officio. Lilburne refused. When
presented with a Bible and told to swear, Lilburne responded:
"To what?"
"That you shall make true answer to all things that are asked of
you."
"Must I so sir? But before I swear, I will know to what I must
swear?"
"As soon as you have sworn, you shall, but not before."'28
Lilburne persisted in his refusal to take the oath, fearing that the court
aimed "to make [him] betray [his] own innocency, that so they might
ground the bill upon [his] own words, ' 29 and was returned to prison.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 44-53.
Horowitz, supra note 18, at 123.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 141-42.
See L. LEVY, supra note 18, at 430-32.
Id. at 431-32; Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo TenaturProdereSeipsum,
25 CLEV. B.A.J. 91, 97-99 (1954).
27. Lilburne was a political activist who made civil disobedience a way of life. He
was a political pamphleteer, leader of the Levellers (a Puritan reformation group) and
the catalytic agent in the history of the right against self-incrimination. See M. GIBB,
JOHN LILBURNE, THE LEVELLER: A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT (1947); L. LEVY, supra

note 18, at 273 n.9.
28. Trial of John Lilburne and John Warton, How. St. Tr., III, 1315, 1318 (1637)
(account written by Lilburne, cited in L. LEVY, supra note 18, at 275).
29. Id. at 1320.
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Approximately two months later, the Court of Star Chamber resummoned Lilburne and told him to take the oath. He again rebuffed
the court and was found in contempt. Lilbume's sentence included a
fine, punishment in the pillory, and imprisonment for the period of
noncompliance. In addition, he was whipped through the streets en
30
route from Fleet Prison to the pillory.
Lilburne's case attracted wide attention and public sympathy.
Others soon began to refuse to take the oath ex officio despite the demands of the Court of Star Chamber. 31 Finally, after two years of
Puritan insurrection and civil disobedience, the King of England,
Charles I, reluctantly accepted a Parliamentary statute that abolished
the courts of the High Commission and the Star Chamber and, with
32
them, the repugnant oath ex officio.

No constitutional documents incorporating a privilege against
self-accusation emerged in England from the Puritan revolution.
When Parliament enacted the English Bill of Rights in 1689, England
still lacked such a document. By that time, however, "the privilege
had become so well established and universally recognized that to
have inserted it would have been very much like re-affirming the law
' '33
of gravitation.

The American colonists maintained the ideals of Lilburne and his
followers who fought for the abolition of the Court of Star Chamber
and the oath ex officio. 34 Although inquisitional examinations occurred in the colonies, they were often the subject of bitter protest. 35
30. Although he was almost beaten to death, Lilburne put on a spirited show of
defiance. From the pillory, Lilburne spoke to the gathered crowd explaining his refusal to take the inquisition oath. When he refused to be silenced, Lilbume was
gagged. Based upon a report of Lilburne's conduct by the warden of Fleet, the Star
Chamber issued a new order punishing Lilburne for his behavior on the pillory. He
was ordered to be "laid alone with irons on his hands and legs" in the part of the
prison "where the basest and meanest sort" were kept. He was denied visitors, books,
and writing materials. There, they kept him in a dungeon chained and without a bed
for five weeks, starving him for the first ten days. See L. LEVY, supra note 18, at 277;
see also M. GIaB, supra note 27, at 45-56; Wolfram, John Lilburne:Democracy'sPillar
of Fire, 3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213 (1952).
Eventually Lilburne carried his complaint to the "Long Parliament" which vacated the sentence and granted him a large sum in reparation. See Fortas, supra note
26, at 96-97. For a more complete discussion of Lilburne's plight, see Wolfram, supra
note 30.
31. See L. LEVY, supra note 18, at 278; see also Maguire, Attack of the Common
Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio as Administered in the EcclesiasticalCourts il Eng-

land, in

ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY

199 (C. Wittke ed. 1936).

32. See Pittman, The Colonial and ConstitutionalHistory of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 772 (1935).
33. Id. at 774.
34. See id. at 769.
35. Id.; see also L. LEVY, supra note 18, at 368-404 (Levy notes that the right
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By the end of the eighteenth Century, the privilege had been firmly
embraced by the American colonies 36 and made a part of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Since that time, the
United States Supreme Court has frequently recognized the importance of the privilege against self-accusation and the fundamental values that it protects. 37 In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,38 the
privilege was described as "an important advance in the development
of our liberty - 'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make
himself civilized.' -39

III.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF TESTIMONIAL IMMUNITY

Until 1857, the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination was absolute; no means existed to compel a witness to provide
self-incriminating testimony. In 1857, however, Congress passed the
first federal immunity statute in order to facilitate congressional investigations. 40 Passed with little debate for purposes of political expedience, the statute protected any witness from prosecution regarding
"any fact or act touching which he shall [have testified] before either
House of Congress or any committee of either House. 4 1 So worded,
the statute provided a virtual "immunity
bath" to all witnesses testify42
ing before congressional committees.
against self-incrimination was but "shakily" established in 17th century America, but
that it was well recognized by the time of independence).
36. By 1789, seven American states had incorporated a privilege against self-incrimination into their constitutions or bills of rights. The seven included: Virginia
(June, 1776); Pennsylvania (September, 1776); Maryland (November, 1776); North
Carolina (December, 1776); Vermont (July, 1777); Massachusetts (March, 1780); and
New Hampshire (March, 1784). POORE'S CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS (1877);
see also Pittman, supra note 32, at 764-65.
37. See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956); see also Maness

v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445-46
(1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
38. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
39. Id. at 55 (quoting Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 426). Dean Erwin N. Griswold once
observed that the emergence of the privilege reflects "an expression of the moral striving of the community" and "an ever present reminder of our belief in the importance
of the individual, a symbol of our highest aspirations." E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY

73, 81 (1955). Interestingly, Griswold, as Solicitor General,

later argued on behalf of the United States in Kastigar.
40. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155, amended by Act of Jan. 24, 1862,
ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333 (indirectly declared unconstitutional in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 46-49)); see Note, The
Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional
Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1571-72 (1963) [hereinafter Federal Witness Immunity
Acts]; see generally Note, The Scope of TestimonialImmunity Under the Fifth Amendment: Kastigar v. United States, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 350 (1973).
41. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155.
42. Note, Federal Witness Immunity Acts, supra note 40, at 1572.
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Five years later, Congress radically amended the 1857 statute. 4 3
As amended, it prohibited only the use of the actual testimony before

Congress in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the testifying witness. The government remained free to prosecute the witness based on
evidence derived from his or her congressional testimony. 44 In 1868,
Congress enacted a statute similar to the amended version of the congressional investigations provision. This statute created use immunity
45

for all those who testified in a federal "judicial proceeding.

The first challenge to the 1868 "judicial proceeding" provision
reached the United States Supreme Court nearly twenty-five years after its enactment in Counselman v. Hitchcock 46 In Counselman, the
United States Supreme Court found the 1868 federal use immunity
statute unconstitutional because it prohibited only the actual use of
compelled testimony and permitted the use of evidence derived from
that testimony in a subsequent prosecution. The Supreme Court
stated that it was "clearly of the opinion that no statute which leaves
the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the incriminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the
'47
privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States."

Although the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Counselman has been the subject of some dispute, the belief that the Constitution required a grant of transactional immunity to compel the
testimony of a witness appears to have been an integral part of the
Court's ruling. 48 The Court stated that "[i]n view of the constitutional
43. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333.
44. Id.
45. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37 (revised and codified into law in
Section 860 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 and declared unconstitutional in Counselman, 142 U.S. 547). Section 860 provided:
No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained from a party
or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this or any foreign country,
shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him or his property
or estate, in any court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, or
for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture: Provided, That this section
shall not exempt any party or witness from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed in discovering or testifying as aforesaid.
46. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
47. Id. at 585.
48. Before Kastigar,only a few jurists had questioned the extent to which Counselman actually required transactional immunity as a matter of constitutional doctrine. See Stevens y. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 249 (1966) (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart,
J., concurring); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 106 (1964) (White, J.,
joined by Stewart, J., concurring); see also supra note 13; cf Kastigar,406 U.S. at 455
n.39. The language of Counselman and succeeding cases, however, consistently reflects the view that anything short of transactional immunity would be constitutionally insufficient. See, e.g., Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 551, 565 (1971)
(Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting), dismissing cert. to People v. La Bello, 24 N.Y.
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provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the ques'49
tion relates."

In response to Counselman, Congress enacted a transactional im-

munity statute providing that no person compelled to testify before the
Interstate Commerce Commission could be "prosecuted or subjected
to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence,

documentary or otherwise."' 50 Like the use immunity statute in Counselman, the new transactional immunity statute was challenged. This
time, however, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Brown
v. Walker, 5 1 found that the statute passed constitutional muster.
In Brown, the witness argued that no immunity law could be constitutional because the fifth amendment absolutely prohibits forced
self-incrimination. He contended that, notwithstanding the grant of
transactional immunity, he would be exposed to public disgrace by
answering questions regarding activities potentially criminal in na-

ture.52 The Supreme Court upheld the law, stating that an immunity

statute need only be coextensive with the protections afforded by the
fifth amendment privilege.5 3 According to the Court, the statute need
not protect one's reputation from injury. The transactional immunity
statute upheld in Brown was, until 1970, "the basic form for the nu'54
merous federal immunity statutes.
2d 598, 249 N.E.2d 412 (1969); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1959);
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 428 (1943).
49. 142 U.S. at 586.
50. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443, repealedby Act of Oct. 17, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(b), (c), 92 Stat. 1466. Congress apparently read Counselman
as requiring transactional immunity.
51. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
52. Id. at 593, 606.
53. Id. at 605-06. Brown was a 5-4 decision. Only a narrow one vote margin
allowed even this transactional immunity statute to pass constitutional muster. The
dispute within the Court concerning the wisdom of permitting even transactional immunity did not end with the court's decision in Brown. Years later, the minority
found new voices in Justices Douglas and Black who wrote in favor of overruling
Brown on the basis of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) ("[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be
forfeited... is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the fifth amendment to the Constitution ....
"),and adopted the view of the minority in Brown that
the right of silence created by the fifth amendment is simply beyond the reach of
Congress. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 440 (1956) (Douglas and Black,
JJ., dissenting).
54. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 452 (1972) (footnote omitted). After
the transactional immunity statute was enacted to compel testimony in proceedings
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, Congress regularly enacted similar provisions into other regulatory laws. Prior to the statute enacted in 1970, "there were in
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In 1956, sixty years after Brown, the Supreme Court reviewed a
55
similar transactional immunity statute in Ullmann v. United States.
Once again, the witness argued that no immunity law could supplant
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court
rejected this position and upheld the statute, following its holding in
56
Brown.
In 1968, as part of its vigorous focus on crime control, Congress
enacted a general transactional immunity statute for federal grand juries and courts.57 Congress patterned the statute after those reviewed
in Brown and Ullmann. Two years later, however, "after re-examining
applicable constitutional principles and the adequacy of existing
law,"' 5 8 Congress repealed this transactional immunity statute and
passed a use and derivative use immunity statute.5 9 This marked the
first time that a use immunity scheme had been operative in the United
States since 1892 when the Supreme Court declared the 1868 use immunity statute unconstitutional. 60 Thus, seventy-eight years after the
Supreme Court held that a grant of use immunity was insufficient to
compel testimony over a fifth amendment protest and strongly implied
that nothing less than transactional immunity would suffice, Congress
extended the power of government to compel a witness to provide potentially self-incriminating testimony.
The inevitable constitutional challenge came two years later, in
Kastigarv. United States.6 1 In Kastigar, the petitioners had been subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury to testify under the limited grant of use and derivative use immunity conferred pursuant to
the new federal law. The petitioners refused to answer upon the
ground that "the scope of the immunity provided by the statute was
not coextensive with the scope of the [constitutional] privilege against
force over 50 federal immunity statutes" mainly based on the initial transactional immunity statute enacted in 1893. Id. at 447 (footnote omitted).

55. 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (reviewing the Immunity Act of 1954, ch. 769, 68 Stat.
745 (establishing procedures for compelled testimony before a grand jury or federal
court involving interference with or endangering of the national security or defense of
the United States) (repealed 1970)).
56. Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 439.
57. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 802, 82 Stat. 197, 216, repealed by Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 227(a), 84 Stat. 930.
58. Kastigar,406 U.S. at 452 n.36.
59. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 201(a), 84 Stat.
926-928 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1982)).
60. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
Both use and derivative use immunity and use immunity may be classified as "use
immunity schemes." For differences between the two, see supra note 8.
61. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

1986]

USE AND DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY

self-incrimination. '62 The Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the
use and derivative use immunity law. 63 Justice Powell, for the majority, wrote:
The [fifth amendment] privilege has never been construed to mean
that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted. Its sole
concern is to afford protection against being "forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of 'penalties affixed to ...

criminal

acts.'" Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as
evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the
compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the
the infliction of criminal penalties on the
testimony
64 cannot lead to
witness.
Kastigarhas been viewed as an unfortunate anomaly in the case
law. 65 Subsequent to Counselman and Brown, court after court restated the view that transactional immunity from prosecution represents the only safeguard coextensive with the privilege against selfincrimination embodied in the fifth amendment. 66 The year prior to
the Supreme Court's opinion in Kastigar, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit stated the traditional position on witness
immunity:
[The] record of what the Supreme Court has done and various Justices have said over almost 80 years seem[s] to warrant the conclusion that it has become authoritative constitutional doctrine that no
less than a grant of full transactional immunity can justify compelprivilege to
ling a witness who has asserted his Fifth Amendment
67
testify about suspected criminal wrongdoing.
The Supreme Court's dismantling in Kastigar of what the Third Circuit viewed as "authoritative constitutional doctrine" was inconsistent
62. Id. at 442.
63. Id. at 462. The majority believed its holding was "consistent with the conceptual basis of Counselman." Id. at 453. Justices Douglas and Marshall dissented in
separate opinions on the grounds that a grant of use and derivative use immunity is
not constitutionally sufficient to compel a witness's testimony. Id. at 462-71.
64. Id. at 453 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
65. Kastigar was characterized by the Hawaii Supreme Court as a "tear in the
'fabric' of the Federal Constitution." State v. Miyasaki, 62 Haw. 269, 282, 614 P.2d
915, 923 (1980); see also Note, Districtof Columbia Court of Appeals Project on Criminal Procedure, 28 How. L.J. 1, 88 (1985) (discussing the "judicial indecision" flowing
from Kastigar).
66. For example, Justice Brennan in dissent in Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S.
548, 563 (1971) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted), stated that
"[m]ere use immunity, which protects the individual only against the actual use of his
compelled testimony and its fruits, satisfies neither the language of the Constitution
itself nor the values, purposes, and policies that the privilege was historically designed
to serve and that it must serve in a free country." See also cases cited supra note 48.
67. United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 43 (3d Cir. 1971), rev'd,
Elias v. Catena, 406 U.S. 952 (1972).
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with the jurisprudential and political history of the privilege against
self-incrimination and with over seventy-five years of law developed by
the Court itself.
Justice Marshall greeted the majority opinion in Kastigar with
incredulity, stating that he could not "believe [that] the Fifth Amendment permits [the] result" reached by the majority. 68 In his dissenting
opinion, Marshall wrote:
The Fifth Amendment gives a witness an absolute right to resist
interrogation, if the testimony sought would tend to incriminate
him. A grant of immunity may strip the witness of the right to
refuse to testify, but only if it is broad enough to eliminate all possibility that the testimony will in fact operate to incriminate him. It
must put him in precisely the same position, vis-a-vis the government that has compelled his testimony, as he would
69 have been in
had he remained silent in reliance on the privilege.
Even the Kastigarmajority conceded that any immunity statute,
to be constitutional, must leave the witness in substantially the same
position as he would have been in had he exercised the privilege
against self-incrimination. 70 It then, however, made a largely conclusory leap in finding that the new use and derivative use immunity
statute met this requirement by imposing on the prosecution a "heavy
burden" of proof on the issue of the independence of the source of any
7
evidence used in a subsequent prosecution against the witness. ' Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, identified two substantial
problems with what have come to be known as Kastigar "taint hearings." He wrote:
First, contrary to the Court's assertion, the Court's rule does leave
the witness "dependent for the preservation of his rights upon the
integrity and good faith of the prosecuting authorities."... For the
information relevant to the question of taint is uniquely within the
knowledge of the prosecuting authorities. They alone are in a position to trace the chains of information and investigation that lead to
the evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution. A witness who
suspects that his compelled testimony was used to develop a lead
will be hard pressed indeed to ferret out the evidence necessary to
prove it. And of course it is no answer to say he need not prove it,
for though the Court puts the burden of proof on the government,
the government will have no difficulty in meeting its burden by mere
assertion if the witness produces no contrary evidence. The good
faith of the prosecuting authorities is thus the sole safeguard of the
witness'[s] rights. Second, even their good faith is not a sufficient
safeguard. For the paths of information through the investigative
bureaucracy may well be long and winding, and even a prosecutor
68.
69.
70.
71.

Kastigar,406 U.S. at 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 467-68 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 461-62.
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acting in the best of faith cannot be certain that somewhere in the
depths of his investigative apparatus, often including hundreds of
employees, there was not some prohibited use of the compelled testimony ....

The Court today sets out a loose net to trap tainted

evidence and prevent its use against the witness, but it accepts an
intolerably
great risk that tainted evidence will in fact slip through
72
that net.

Justice Douglas similarly rejected the majority's decision in Kastigar. He rooted his dissent in the language of Counselman, which required that "a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute
immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates."' 73 Justice Douglas, quoting from an earlier dissenting
opinion by Justice Brennan, argued that when removing a witness's
constitutional privilege, "'[b]oth witness and government [should]
know precisely where they stand. Respect for law is furthered when
the individual knows his position and is not left suspicious that a later
prosecution was actually the fruit of his compelled testimony.' "74 Use
and derivative use immunity, argued Douglas, does not entirely remove a defendant's suspicions in this regard. "[I]t is futile to expect
that a ban on use or derivative use of compelled testimony can be enforced. 75 . . . A witness might believe, with good reason, that his 'immunized' testimony will inevitably lead to a felony conviction."
IV.

A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF IMMUNITY IN ALASKA

Early Immunity Statutes

The legislature of the territorial government passed several immunity statutes prior to Alaska statehood in 1959.76 All of these statutes, including one enacted only four years prior to statehood,
required a grant of transactional immunity before permitting the compulsion of testimony over an assertion of the privilege against selfincrimination.
Alaska's first transactional immunity statute was enacted thirtysix years before statehood, and provided for the granting of transactional immunity to witnesses testifying before the Senate, the House of
Representatives, or committees of either. 77 In 1951, a transactional
immunity statute was passed protecting witnesses compelled to testify
72. Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 463 (Douglas, 3., dissenting) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 586 (1892)).
74. Id. at 466 (quoting Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 568-69 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
75. Id. at 467 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
77. 1923 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 36, § 7 (codified as ALASKA STAT. § 24.25.070
(1985)). The statute provides:
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in matters before the Department of Commerce. 78 Finally, in 1955,
the legislature enacted a transactional immunity statute that permitted
the Department of Labor to compel testimony over an assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination. 79
B.

Judicial Development of the Immunity Issue

The Alaska Supreme Court has considered the issue of the level
of immunity necessary to compel testimony over an invocation of the

privilege against self-incrimination on several occasions. Although the
court has not addressed the issue of whether use and derivative use

immunity is constitutionally sufficient, it has consistently expressed a
strong preference for transactional immunity.
(a) A person called as a witness before the senate, house of representatives, or a committee of either or both, who refuses to answer any question
or to produce any book, paper or document relating to the matter under
inquiry, on the ground that the answer or the production may tend to incriminate the person, may be granted immunity from punishment for the
offense to which the question or evidence relates by resolution of the House
that is conducting the inquiry. The resolution shall be entered upon its journal, and the witness may then be compelled to answer the question or produce the evidence.
(b) If a witness is granted immunity and compelled to testify or produce evidence after claiming the privilege of self-incrimination, the witness
may not thereafter be prosecuted in any court for the offense to which the
question or evidence relates.

Id.
78. 1951 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 129, § 2.104H (codified as ALASKA STAT.
§ 6.05.020 (1978)). The statute provides in relevant part:
The department may subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, require the production of evidence, administer oaths and examine any person
under oath in connection with any subject relating to a duty imposed upon
or a power vested in the department. These powers shall be enforced by the
superior court. An individual who claims privilege against self-incrimination may be compelled to testify, but he shall not be prosecuted or subjected
to a penalty or forfeiture on account of anything concerning which he has
testified under compulsion, except for perjury commmitted in his testimony.

Id.
79. 1955 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 5, § 321 (codified as ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.070
(1984)). The statute provides:
A person may not be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records before
the department, or in obedience to a subpoena of the department in a cause
or proceeding before the department, or an appeal tribunal, on the ground
that the testimony or evidence required of the person may tend to incriminate the person or subject the person to a penalty or forfeiture. An individual may not be prosecuted or subjected to a penalty or forfeiture for or on
account of a transaction, matter, or thing concerning which the individual is
compelled, after having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or produce evidence. However, the individual testifying is not exempt
from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in testifying.

1986]

USE AND DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY

1. McCracken v. Corey. The Alaska Supreme Court first considered the problems associated with immunity in McCracken v. Corey.80
Curiously, McCracken did not involve a grant of immunity by either a
prosecutor or the legislature. The McCracken trial court unilaterally
imposed immunity on the defendant.
McCracken, who had previously been convicted of a felony offense, was arrested while on parole and charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. The alleged offense, if proven, constituted a
violation of both Alaska law81 and the conditions of McCracken's parole. A parole revocation hearing and criminal trial were scheduled,
with the parole revocation hearing to precede the criminal trial. McCracken applied for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction staying the revocation proceedings until after the criminal
trial. He claimed that the scheduled order of the proceedings would
force him to stand mute at the parole revocation hearing in order to
preserve his defenses at the criminal trial and avoid self-incrimination.
The superior court refused to reverse the order of the two proceedings
and ordered that "the [probation revocation] hearing be closed to all
persons other than those 'essentially necessary' and that 'any testimony given on behalf of the defense should not be used against the
defendant in any way whatsoever .... ",,82
McCracken declined to testify at the revocation proceeding. The
parole board found McCracken in violation of the conditions of his
release and remanded him to custody to continue serving his original
sentence. At his criminal trial four months later, McCracken was acquitted. 83 McCracken filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming denial of due process at the revocation hearing. On appeal,
McCracken argued that, despite the immunity bestowed upon him by
the superior court, the scheduling of the revocation hearing before the
criminal trial forced him to choose between producing evidence at the
hearing that might later incriminate him84or remaining silent at the
hearing and foregoing a valuable defense.
The McCracken court examined a number of United States
Supreme Court decisions and confirmed the well-established principle
that the right to exercise the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination cannot be conditioned upon the forfeiture of another
80. 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska 1980).
81. ALASKA STAT. § 11.55.030 (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200.250 (1983)).
82. 612 P.2d at 991. The superior court's order was essentially a grant of use
immunity which did not preclude prosecution of McCracken for the offense with
which he was charged or any other matters that were the subject of his testimony
before the parole board.
83. Id. at 992.
84. Id. at 991-92.
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constitutionally protected right.8 5 The McCracken court noted, however, that in other cases involving apparent penalties for the assertion
of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court had characterized the
choices that defendants faced as tactical decisions and had rejected
their constitutional challenges. 8 6 Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court
needed to decide whether the choice forced upon McCracken constituted a penalty for the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination or if, instead, it merely presented him with a tactical decision.8 7
Like most courts that have confronted this issue, the McCracken
court declined to address the constitutional question and resolved the
problem by invoking the court's inherent supervisory powers.88 The
court held that:
where a parolee is faced with both revocation and a criminal trial
based upon the same conduct, upon timely objection any evidence
or testimony presented by the parolee at a revocation hearing is
inadmissible by the state in subsequent criminal proceedings. This
exclusionary rule applies equally to the fruits of the parolee's prior
revocation hearing, "in order to remove completely any illegitimate
incentive to schedule revocation hearings in advance of trial."8 9

McCracken did not concern the compulsion of immunized testimony. The McCracken rule is an exclusionary rule, comparable to the
rule of Simmons v. United States,90 which states that a defendant's
testimony at a suppression hearing on the issue of standing to object to
evidence may not thereafter be admitted against him on the issue of
guilt. 9 1 The Simmons court formulated its rule in light of the fact that
a suppression hearing must precede the criminal trial to which it re85. Id. at 993-94 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431
U.S. 801 (1977) (impermissible to condition right to hold political party office on
agreement to testify before a grand jury and waive immunity); Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273 (1968) (police officer improperly fired for refusing to waive immunity
and privilege against self-incrimination before grand jury investigating police corrup-

tion); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (defendant's testimony at
suppression hearing on issue of standing to object to evidence may not be used against
him on the issue of guilt, because it is "intolerable that one constitutional right should
have to be surrendered in order to assert another"); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967) (attorney impermissibly disbarred for failure to furnish incriminating records).
86. McCracken, 612 P.2d at 994-95. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
213 (1971) (approving state procedure of having single trial on issues of guilt and
punishment - despite defendant's contention that procedure presented an intolerable
tension between due process right to address sentencer and privilege against self-incrimination - since procedure did not "impair to an appreciable extent any of the
policies behind the rights involved").
87. 612 P.2d at 994.
88. Id. at 998.
89. Id. at 998 (quoting People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 891, 533 P.2d 1024,
1043, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 403 (1975)).
90. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
91. Id.
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lates and that every defendant who testifies at a suppression hearing
cannot be granted transactional immunity. Similarly, the Alaska
Supreme Court in McCracken recognized that the state's interest in
initiating prompt revocation proceedings upon the occurrence of a
criminal offense may in some instances justify holding the revocation
proceedings before the criminal trial. 92 Because parole revocation proceedings must, at least in some cases, precede the outcome of a criminal trial, use and derivative use immunity represents the most
stringent grant of immunity practically available. Due to the narrow
holding in McCracken, the Alaska Supreme Court's acceptance of use
and derivative use exclusion suggests little in regard to the type of
immunity required when the state seeks to compel testimony.
Furthermore, the McCracken and Simmons cases differ sharply
from compelled testimony cases in that, though defendants have a
constitutional right to testify in both suppression and revocation proceedings, they retain the absolute right to stand silent at such proceedings. This situation is quite different from the nondiscretionary
compulsion to testify provided by new immunity statutes. 93 While
harm to a defendant may in fact flow from his decision not to testify at
a suppression hearing, or even at a probation revocation hearing, he
still has other rights on which to rely, most notably the government's
burden of affirmatively proving guilt. In contrast, refusal to testify
under a statute which allows the compulsion of testimony upon the
grant of immunity can subject a witness to imprisonment. A compulsory statute that cuts more drastically into the right against self-incrimination would seem to warrant a greater extension of immunity
than that condoned in the non-compulsory settings of McCracken and
Simmons.
2. Surina v. Buckalew. The immunity issue did not lie dormant
for long. Within one year the problem arose again, although in a different setting, in the case of Surina v. Buckalew. 94 Surina presented
the question whether, in the absence of an authorizing statute, 95 a
92. 612 P.2d at 999. Chief Justice Rabinowitz, concurring, expressed his opinion
that revocation proceedings should always be suspended until after the outcome of
related criminal proceedings. Id. at 999-1001.
93. While the right to stand silent at a suppression hearing on one's behalf may be
a very hollow right, since in many cases the defendant's testimony is the only way of
establishing the basis for suppression, a valid distinction is nonetheless made between
this kind of incentive to testify and actual compulsion to testify under penalty for
contempt of court or contempt of Congress.
94. 629 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1981).
95. In 1980 and 1981, when Surina was litigated, the Alaska legislature had not
enacted an immunity statute for use in court proceedings. Various immunity statutes
had been proposed to the legislature during its previous session but none were enacted.
Surina argued on appeal that the absence of enactment of an immunity statute by the
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promise of immunity 96 by a state prosecutor and a court may be used
to compel testimony from a witness in a criminal proceeding, despite
97

the witness's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination.

The court concluded that, as a matter of Alaska law, "prosecutors in
the instant case had the inherent authority, even in the absence of enabling legislation, to grant immunity and to use that grant to compel
testimony which would
98 otherwise be protected by the privilege against

self-incrimination."

The Surina court also discussed the scope of the grant of immunity necessary to compel testimony. The court expressed its view that
Rule 732 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 732"), a
transactional immunity provision,99 provided guidance concerning the
legislature was indicative of a legislative intent not to approve such immunity grants.
The state argued that an equally reasonable interpretation was that the legislature
assumed the prosecutor already had sufficient authority to make such promises without any enabling legislation. The Alaska Supreme Court regarded the "evidence on
this point as too nebulous and tenuously connected to support an inference either
way." Id. at 978 n.20.
96. The witness was promised use and derivative use immunity, as well as at least
partial transactional immunity. The scope of the transactional immunity is unclear
from the opinion. Id. at 970-71.
97. The decision proper did not touch upon the issue of the constitutionality of
the scope of the grants of immunity. Indeed, the Surina court went to great lengths to
make that clear. See id. at 973, 979 n.21, 980. Nevertheless, the court did indicate in
dicta that transactional immunity is required by the Alaska Constitution. See infra
text accompanying notes 99-102.
98. 629 P.2d at 979. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that it
found "merit in the position that the decision here [on immunity] should be a legislative one." Id. at 978.
Surina also argued that the prosecution could not guarantee that its part of the
bargain would be kept (i.e., that the immunity would be efficacious), and that to mandate a waiver of a constitutional right in return for such a "slim promise" was unconscionable. See Apodaca v. Viramontes, 53 N.M. 514, 521-22, 212 P.2d 425, 429
(1949). In addition, Surina relied on the case of Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244,
177 N.E. 489 (1931), which held invalid a joint legislative resolution purporting to
grant immunity for testimony before a legislative committee.
99. UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 732, 10 U.L.A. 340 (1974) provides:
(a) In any proceeding under these Rules, if a witness refuses to answer
or produce information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, the [district] court, unless it finds that to do so would not further the
administration of justice, shall compel him to answer or produce information if:
(1) The prosecuting attorney makes a written request to the [district] court to order the witness to answer or produce information,
notwithstanding his claim of privilege; and
(2) The [district] court informs the witness that by so doing he
will receive immunity under subdivision (b).
(b) If, but for this Rule, the witness would have been privileged to
withhold the answer or information given, and he complies with an order
under subdivision (a) compelling him to answer or produce information, he
may not be prosecuted or subjected to criminal penalty in the courts of this
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proper scope of an immunity grant.10 0 The court noted that it had
referred Rule 732 to its Standing Advisory Committee on Criminal
Rules for study and recommendation and indicated that in the interim
this rule should serve as a guide for grants of immunity. Since the
issue had not been raised, the court declined to specifically endorse
transactional immunity. The court stated, however, that "the prosecution may make its position unassailable by complying with subsection (b) [requiring transactional immunity]." 0 1 In summary, the
court stated:
We do note that any immunity grant less than approved in Kastigar
(use and derivative use immunity) is unconstitutional; and that a
grant of transactional immunity on both state and federal levels
would clearly suffice to justify compelling the testimony, under any
standard. We leave for another day the question of what the Alaska
Constitution requires in this respect. And we leave, either to the
legislature or to our own determination after the recommendation
of the Advisory Commission on Criminal Rules is submitted, the
policy question of which option within the constitutional limits is
preferable. 102
3. State v. Serdahely. Within the year, the court was squarely
presented with the issue it had refrained from specifically deciding in
Surina: whether testimony may be compelled upon a grant of use and
derivative use immunity. In the cases collectively known as "the
Hohman case,"' 0 3 the state sought to compel the testimony of one of
State for or on account of any transaction or matter concerning which, in
compliance with the order, he gave answer or produced information.
(c) A witness granted immunity under this Rule may nevertheless be
subjected to criminal penalty for any perjury, false swearing, or contempt
committed in answering, failing to answer, or failing to produce information
in compliance with the order.
100. Surina, 629 P.2d at 979 n.21.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 980. The Surina court invited legislative action in two areas in the
opinion. In their discussion of whether the prosecution has the authority to make a
grant of immunity, the court expressed a "crying need" for appropriate legislation.
Id. at 978 (quoting.Apodaca, 53 N.M. at 523, 212 P.2d at 430). The court noted that
the decision in Surina does not foreclose legislative action on this question. On the
separate issue of the scope of the grant of immunity required before testimony can be
compelled, the court invited the legislature to address the policy question of whether
use and derivative use immunity, or transactional immunity, is preferable. It expressly and necessarily reserved to itself the question of what the Alaska Constitution
requires in this respect. Id. at 980.
103. Senator George Hohman and three other individuals were charged in bribery
and perjury indictments. Senator Hohman was convicted of bribery offenses and
Michael DeMan was convicted of pejury. The case against one of the other defendants was dismissed by the state following a grant of immunity to obtain his testimony
and the state deferred prosecution of the case against the fourth defendant. See court
files in State v. Hohman, No. IJU-81-464 Cr. (Superior Ct. Alaska, 1st Judicial Dist.,
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the defendants, Michael DeMan, against the then State Senator,
George Hohman, through a grant of use and derivative use immunity.
DeMan had been indicted for perjury in his testimony before the
grand jury. The state desired to compel DeMan's testimony, but
wished to remain free to prosecute him for the perjury offense. Believing that a conviction against DeMan could be obtained without having
to use his actual testimony at the Hohman trial or any evidence derived therefrom, the state offered DeMan use and derivative use
immunity.
DeMan objected to the grant of use and derivative use immunity.
In a lengthy decision, superior court Judge Douglas J. Serdahely rejected Kastigar and ruled that Alaska required transactional immunity.' °4 Judge Serdahely found that transactional immunity was
required both as a matter of state constitutional doctrine and as a matter of judicial policy in the exercise of the court's supervisory powers.10 5 Use 6and derivative use immunity was, in his opinion,
0
insufficient. 1
The state appealed Judge Serdahely's decision to the Alaska
Court of Appeals. For purposes of expediency, the case, State v.
Serdahely,'0 7 was certified directly to the Alaska Supreme Court
which affirmed Judge Serdahely's decision requiring transactional immunity. The court did not, however, do so on constitutional grounds.
In a short per curiam order with no explanation or analysis, the court,
pursuant to its supervisory powers, adopted Rule 732 of the Uniform
Rules of Criminal Procedure as "a rule of practice, including subsection (b) relating to the nature and scope of immunity for the reason
08
expressed in the commentary to the rule."'
C. Legislative Response to Serdahely: Adoption of Use and
Derivative Use Immunity Statute.
In the year following Serdahely, the Alaska legislature enacted a
use and derivative use immunity statute at the request of the Alaska
Department of Law.109 The commentary accompanying the bill
noted: "The legislature in adopting the approach set forth in this sec1981); State v. DeMan, No. 1JU-81-477 Cr. (Superior Ct. Alaska, 1st Judicial Dist.,
1981); State v. Kelly, No. 1JU-81-465 Cr. (Superior Ct. Alaska, Ist Judicial Dist.,
1981); State v. Larsen, No. IJU-81-478 Cr. (Superior Ct. Alaska, 1st Judicial Dist.,
1981).
104. DeMan, No. 1JU-81-477 Cr.; Ilohman, No. IJU-81-464 Cr.
105. DeMan, No. 1JU-81-477 Cr., at 4.
106. Id.
107. 635 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1981).
108. Id.
109. 1982 Sess. Laws, ch. 143, § 23 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 12.50.101
(1984)). This statute provides:
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tion has determined that a requirement of 'use/derivative use' immunity as opposed to 'transactional' immunity is the preferable approach
both as a matter of sound public policy and as a matter of constitutional requirement." ' "10 The legislature knew of the Serdahely decision, but for policy reasons preferred a statute granting only use and
derivative use immunity.

V.

THE ALASKA USE AND DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY STATUTE
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The legislative history of Alaska's use and derivative use immunity statute indicates that the legislature has concluded that such provision is constitutionally sound and, for policy reasons, preferable to a
rule requiring transactional immunity.'
The legislature, however,
reached faulty conclusions and failed to act within its authority in enacting the statute. The statute is inconsistent with the Alaska Constitution's protection against self-incrimination in that it fails to comport
(a) If a witness refuses on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination to testify or provide other information in a criminal proceeding
before or ancillary to a court or grand jury of this state, and a judge issues an
order under (b) of this section, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination. If the witness fully complies with the order, no testimony or other information compelled under the order, or information directly or indirectly derived from
that testimony or other information, may be used against the witness in a
criminal case, except in a prosecution based on perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise knowingly providing false information, or hindering
prosecution.
(b) In the case of an individual who has been or may be called to
testify or provide other information in a criminal proceeding before or ancillary to a court or a grand jury of this state, a superior or district court for the
judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, upon
the application of the attorney general or the attorney general's designee in
accordance with (d) of this section, an order requiring the individual to give
testimony or provide other information that the individual refuses to give or
provide based on the privilege against self-incrimination.
(c) An order issued under (b) of this section is effective when communicated to the individual specified in the order.
(d) The attorney general or the attorney general's designee may apply
for an order under (b) of this section when, in the judgment of the attorney
general or the attorney general's designee,
(1) the testimony or other information may be necessary to the
administration of criminal justice; and
(2) the individual who is the subject of the application has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or to provide other information on
the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination.
(e) As used in this section, "other information" means books, papers,
documents, records, recordings, or other similar material.
Id.
110. See ALASKA HOUSE J. Supp. No. 64, § 23 (June 2, 1982).
111. Id.
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with the policies underlying the privilege, with prior Alaska Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the constitution, and with the intent of
the drafters of the constitution.1 2 Moreover, the Alaska Constitution
relegates to the Alaska Supreme Court primary responsibility for developing rules of procedure."13 In State v. Serdahely, 114 the supreme
court exercised its prerogative and adopted both the Uniform Rule of
Criminal Procedure 732 and its accompanying commentary. Under
the Alaska Constitution, the legislature may change a rule adopted by
the supreme court only by following certain specified procedures, and
then only by a two-thirds majority vote of each house of the legislature." 5 The legislature failed to fulfill these requirements before enacting the new rule.
A.

The Immunity Statute is Inconsistent with the Alaska
Constitution's Protection Against Self-Incrimination

The Alaska Supreme Court should reject the immunity statute as
contrary to the protections afforded by the Alaska Constitution for a
number of reasons. First, a grant of use and derivative use immunity,
as a practical matter, is a wholly inadequate substitute for the privilege
against self-incrimination. This type of immunity grant fails to address the lofty principles and policies embodied by the privilege and
affords the witness inadequate protection. Second, use and derivative
use immunity conflicts with the supreme court's history of broadly
interpreting the Alaska Constitution's protections concerning self-incrimination and the right to privacy. Finally, use and derivative use
immunity fails to comport with the intent of the drafters of the Alaska
Constitution.
1. Compelling Testimony Pursuantto a Grant of Mere Use and Derivative Use Immunity is Inconsistent with the Policies Underlying the
PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination. The premise underlying use and
derivative use immunity is that such immunity removes the incriminating nature of testimony. The theory, as explained in Kastigar v.
United States,116 is that use and derivative use immunity affords the
same protection as the privilege against self-incrimination by assuring
that the compelled testimony can in no way lead to the infliction of
criminal penalties." 7 In the real-life world of criminal prosecution,
however, this premise simply does not hold true.
112. See infra Section V(A).
113. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15.
114. 635 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1981), discussed supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.

116. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
117. Id. at 461.
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The practical shortcomings of use and derivative use immunity
have been described at length by commentators,' 1 8 and will, therefore,
only be summarized here. Basically, the pragmatic approach rests on
the belief that, despite the requirement that any evidence used in a
subsequent prosecution be derived from an independent source, it is
impossible to protect against the nonevidentiary use of compelled testimony adverse to the witness's penal interests. Examples of such nonevidentiary use are discussed below. 11 9
a. Discretionary prosecutorial decisions: Immunized testimony
may disclose the guilt of the witness. This, in turn, may affect the
prosecutor's decision on whether to prosecute or plea bargain. It also
may cause the prosecution to focus its investigation on the witness to
the exclusion of other suspects.120
b.

Trialpreparationand trialstrategy: Knowledge of any part of

a witness's compelled testimony may shed new light on old evidence,
helping to explain otherwise known but previously confusing informa-

tion. It may help the prosecution make the connection between existing evidence and the witness, and disclose the significance of

evidence previously thought unimportant. Even a generalized knowledge of the witness's immunized testimony may help a prosecutor anticipate the defendant's defense, thereby aiding the prosecution in its
trial strategy. It may affect opening statements and closing arguments,
point out avenues of impeachment, and lead to additional questions
that might never have been raised absent such knowledge. 12 Finally,
118. See, e.g., UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 732, 10 U.L.A. 340 (1974), commentary at 49-53;
Strachan, Self-Incrimination,Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEx. L. REV. 791 (1978).
119. It is interesting to note that all of the common law exceptions to the privilege
against self-incrimination involve situations in which no prosecution of the witness is
possible. If prosecution is barred by double jeopardy, by pardon, or by the running of
the statute of limitations, the witness may be compelled to testify. Never under any
common law doctrine has a witness been placed in the position of having to divulge
all, when still faced with potential prosecution. State v. Soriano, 68 Or. App. 642,
647, 684 P.2d 1220, 1223-24, aff'd, 298 Or. 392, 693 P.2d 25 (1984).
120. Strachan, supra note 118, at 807; see Reif, The Grand Jury Witness and Compulsory Testimony Legislation, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 829, 856-57 (1972); Mansfield,
The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination and the
Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. Cr. REV. 103, 165.
121. Strachan, supra note 118, at 807-08; see generally United States v. Frumento,
552 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v.
Housand, 550 F.2d 818 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v.
Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); Dershowitz &
Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observationson the Candorand Logic of the
Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); Note, The Fifth Amendment
and Compelled Testimony: PracticalProblems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L.
REV. 470 (1974).

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:229

this advantage may influence
a defendant's decision on whether to ex122
ercise his right to testify.
c. Discovery: The prosecutorial discovery advantage is very simi23
lar to that rejected by the Alaska Supreme Court in Scott v. State. 1
In Scott, the court found that requiring the accused to disclose the
names and addresses of witnesses, witness statements, and other evidence relating to an alibi defense, violated the accused's privilege
24
against self-incrimination under the Alaska Constitution. 1
d. Identification of independent sources: Even though the information contained in compelled testimony cannot, consistent with Kastigar,be directly used to uncover evidence later submitted against the
witness,12 5 "it is much more difficult to develop untainted evidence
while working toward an unknown end than it is to construct
in12 6
dependent sources to support conclusions already [revealed]."'
e. Perjury: Perhaps the most pernicious problem is that knowledge of immunized testimony may facilitate prosecution of the witness
for perjury. Although knowledge of inconsistency in prior testimony
cannot be used directly to impeach, it may cause the prosecution to
investigate the truthfulness of prior testimony and2 aid
in the genera7
tion of independent evidence proving the perjury.,
Because of these potentially undetectable nonevidentiary abuses
of compelled testimony, Oregon has rejected the Kastigar rule. In
State v. Soriano,12 s the Oregon Court of Appeals held that "[t]he citizens of Oregon are entitled, under their constitution, not merely to a
'substantial' substitute for their constitutional rights, but to one which
has 'the same extent in scope and effect.' Mere use and derivative use
29
immunity falls short of that constitutionally-required minimum.'
The Soriano court noted that even the most conscientious prosecutor would be unable to avoid allowing the knowledge that the witness had admitted the crime in his immunized testimony to affect his
handling of the case. It analogized immunized testimony to a deposition which allows the prosecutor to learn the witness's complete story
122. See United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1971) (Seitz,
C.J., concurring), rev'd, Elias v. Catena, 406 U.S. 952 (1972).
123. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
124. Id. at 785-87; see infra notes 142-79 and accompanying text.
125. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
126. Strachan, supra note 118, at 809.
127. Id. at 809-10.
128. 68 Or. App. 642, 684 P.2d 1220, aff'd, 298 Or. 392, 693 P.2d 26 (1984).
129. Id. at 662, 684 P.2d at 1232-33 (footnotes omitted).
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before trial. Acknowledging the possible nonevidentiary uses of such
knowledge, the court observed:
A prosecutor may use immunized testimony in any of these ways
without introducing it or its fruits into evidence, but it is obvious
that none of these actions would be possible if the witness had simply asserted the right to remain silent and had not testified. The
witness is thus more
0 subject to prosecution and conviction because
of the testimony.13
The court then concluded that" '[i]t is unrealistic to give a dog a bone
and to expect him not to chew on it.' . . . We hold that Article I,
section 12 of the Oregon Constitution forbids giving the dog the bone.
131
Only transactional immunity is constitutional in Oregon."
Behind the pragmatic concerns outlined above lie the policies underlying the privilege - policies that are defeated when a witness faces
a grant of immunity and order to testify without the assurance that
compliance will in no way adversely affect his penal interests. It is no
easy task to sum up these policies. As Justice Frankfurter observed,
"The privilege against self-incrimination is a specific provision of
which it is peculiarly true that 'a page of history is worth a volume of
logic.' 132 In Murphy v. Waterfront,133 however, Justice Goldberg
identified some of the values underlying the privilege:
[O]ur unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuse; our sense of fair play which dictates
"a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave
the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him
and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual
to shoulder the entire load;" our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life;" our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
130. Id. at 663, 684 P.2d at 1233.
131. Id. at 665, 684 P.2d at 1234 (quoting State ex rel. Johnson v. Woodrich, 279
Or. 31, 36, 566 P.2d 859, 861 (1977)).
Oregon criminal law and procedure decisions have always been particularly persuasive authority in Alaska. Prior to adoption of the state's new criminal code in
1980, Alaska criminal law consisted primarily of an adoption of the Oregon criminal
code. Revision of the Alaska criminal code began in the mid 1970's, spurred in part
by recent criminal code revisions in Oregon and New York. The Alaska code revision
commission examined the revised codes of 40 states, and drew most heavily from the
revised Oregon statutes in drafting proposed revised code sections. See Stern, The
Proposed Alaska Revised Criminal Code, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 1, 4 (1977).
132. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) (citations omitted); accord
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 565-66 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
dismissal of writ of certiorari).
133. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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sometimes 134
"a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."

These policies become meaningless when any vestige of incriminatory effect, or even perception of potential incriminatory effect,
threatens a witness whose testimony is compelled. The mere perception that one's words may be used against one is as great an evil as the
fact. Use and derivative use immunity does nothing to free a witness
from the trauma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt. 35 It cannot
realistically be said that a witness who realizes that he faces potential
prosecution could confess to wrongdoing without the fear of subjecting himself to punishment. Yet, only two other alternatives exist. The
witness may stand silent and be held in contempt, or perjure himself.
Both "alternatives" carry severe penalties. 136
In addition, a grant of less than transactional immunity seriously
undermines the privilege's role in maintaining the value of our adversarial process. 37 One purpose of the adversarial system is to derive
the truth from the confrontation of opposing points of view. The adversarial model recognizes that the effectiveness of this process is undercut whenever one side is compelled to further the cause of the
other. One called upon to make his opponent's case is likely to present
a distorted view of the truth, or less than the whole truth. Thus, the
compulsion of testimony at a point in which the witness still views
himself in an adversarial posture typically hinders rather than helps
the truth-finding process. Another purpose of the adversarial system
is to attempt to equalize the imbalance present when the state, with all
its resources, brings an action against an individual. This balance is
upset, and the burden of proof effectively altered, when one facing the
possibility of prosecution is compelled to speak.
2. The Alaska ConstitutionalProtection Against Self-Incrimination
Has Been Broadly Interpreted. The Alaska Supreme Court has never
hesitated to find that the protections of the Alaska Constitution exceed
in scope those of the United States Constitution. 138 Moreover, the
134. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
135. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
136. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.200, 12.80.010 (1984).
137. Cf Mendelson, Self-Incrimination in American and French Law, 19 CRIM. L.
BULL. 34 (1983) (discussing the concept of self-incrimination under the French inquisitorial system of criminal prosecution).
138. See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (electronic recording
of suspect interrogations required under state due process right when interrogation
occurs in a place of detention and recording is feasible); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872,
876 n.12 (Alaska 1978), modified by Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1984)
(warrant requirement applied, under Alaska Constitution's right to privacy, to electronic monitoring of a police informant's conversations with a suspect, though federal
Constitution does not require as much); Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138
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Alaska Supreme Court's decisions specifically related to issues of testimonial immunity suggest that the court will eventually hold that the
Alaska Constitution's protection against self-incrimination exceeds in
scope the protection of the United States Constitution and requires a
grant of transactional immunity in order to compel testimony.
Although McCracken v. Corey, 139 Surina v. Buckalew, 14 0 and
State v. Serdahelyl4 l were not decided on constitutional grounds, they
all express the Alaska Supreme Court's view that the privilege against
self-incrimination ought to be interpreted broadly. Given that use and
derivative use is regarded as the minimum grant of immunity acceptable under the United States Constitution, these three cases support the
proposition that the Alaska Constitution's protection against self-incrimination mandates the more expansive award of transactional

immunity.
In Scott v. State,14 2 the Alaska Supreme Court decided that the
scope of the Alaska privilege against self-incrimination exceeds that of
(Alaska 1977) (Alaska constitutional prohibition against warrantless administrative
inspections of business premises broader than federal prohibition); Blue v. State, 558
P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977) (Alaska constitutional right to counsel at preindictment
lineup); Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (1977), opinion on rehearing, 573 P.2d 858
(Alaska 1978) (search incident to arrest exception to warrant requirement narrower
under Alaska Constitution than under federal Constitution); Coleman v. State, 553
P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976) (higher standard for investigative stop by police under Alaska
Constitution than under federal Constitution); Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359
(Alaska 1976) (Alaska equal protection test more demanding than federal test); Ravin
v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (Alaska constitutional right to privacy protects
personal consumption of marijuana in one's home); Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774
(Alaska 1974) (privilege against compelled self-incrimination under Alaska Constitution prohibits extensive pretrial prosecutorial discovery in criminal proceedings);
R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (Alaska constitutional requirement of jury
trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings)i Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska
1970) (right to jury trial broader under Alaska Constitution than under United States
Constitution); Best v. Anchorage, 712 P.2d 892 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (Alaska due
process right exceeds due process right under United States Constitution in requiring
preservation of breath sample during administration of breath alcohol analysis test to
persons charged with driving while intoxicated).
139. 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska 1980), discussed supra notes 80-93 and accompanying
text.
140. 629 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1981), discussed supra notes 94-102 and accompanying
text.
141. 635 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1981), discussed supra notes 103-08 and accompanying
text.
In Serdahely, the court adopted not only Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure
732, but the commentary to the rule as well. To accept the reasoning expressed in the
commentary is to reject the constitutionality of any grant of immunity short of transactional immunity, since the commentary finds use and derivative use immunity to be
an inadequate substitute for the privilege against self-incrimination. UNIF. R. CRIM.
P. 732, 10 U.L.A. 340 (1974), commentary at 40-53.
142. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
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its federal counterpart in the context of prosecutorial discovery. Scott
was charged with rape. The state sought and obtained from the superior court an order requiring the defendant to disclose the following:
(1) the names and addresses of all prospective defense witnesses other
than himself; (2) any written or recorded statements in the defendant's
possession made by prospective witnesses, excluding the defendant
himself; and (3) any alibi defense the defendant intended to raise, together with information indicating the place or places the defendant
would claim to have been and the names of witnesses upon whom he
intended to rely in asserting that defense. On review in the Alaska
Supreme Court the defendant asserted, inter alia, that the court's order infringed upon his privilege against compulsory selfincrimination. 143
The Scott court began by analyzing "the historical development
of criminal discovery in the context of the privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution."' 144 First, it recognized that prosecutorial discovery was strongly
condemned in early American jurisprudence, as reflected in an 1886
United States Supreme Court opinion:
[A]ny compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict
him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles
of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the
purposes of despotic power, but it cannot abide
the pure atmosphere
145
of political liberty and personal freedom.
Next, the Scott court noted some developments in the scope of
prosecutorial discovery. For example, the court observed that in the
1960's some cases and commentary took the view that prosecutorial
discovery should be more of a two-way street, and that the privilege
against self-incrimination was not violated by requiring the defendant
to disclose the names of witnesses to be relied upon in advancing an
46
affirmative defense.'
143. Id. at 775-76. The defendant also argued that Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(c), pertaining to discovery, by its language precluded the court's order, and
that the court's order was violative of his right to effective confrontation and crossexamination. Id. The court rejected the Rule 16(c) argument. Id. at 776-77. The
court did not reach the confrontation argument.
144. 519 P.2d at 778.
145. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886) (footnote
omitted)).
146. In this regard, the Scott court examined Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d
56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962) (favoring broad prosecutorial discovery),
overruledby Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr.
129 (1970), and Traynor, GroundLost and Foundin CriminalDiscovery, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV.

228 (1964). The Scott court also noted that in Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2
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In the third stage of its historical analysis, the court discussed
Williams v. Florida,147 a decision in which the United States Supreme
Court upheld the right of the prosecution, pursuant to a state rule of
criminal procedure, to obtain in advance of trial the names of witnesses and the location of the defendant's alibi, the defendant's claim
of the privilege against self-incrimination notwithstanding. 148 The
gravamen of the Williams decision was that "[h]owever 'testimonial'
or 'incriminating' the alibi defense proves to be, it cannot be considered 'compelled' within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments."' 149 The Williams majority had reasoned that the requirement was merely a matter of timing, regulating when, but not
whether, a defendant would disclose information.
Finally, the Scott court conceded that most courts considering the
issue had upheld similar prosecutorial discovery provisions. 150 However, the Alaska court opined that other courts had not directly confronted the self-incrimination impact of compelled pretrial
disclosure. 1 51 The court noted that one court which had more directly
confronted this issue had concluded that "while much of the statute
requiring a defendant to make a pretrial disclosure of his defense and
applihis witnesses may not on its face be unconstitutional, the use or
15 2
cation of the statute may lead to an unconstitutional result."'
After conducting its historical analysis, the Scott court noted its
responsibility to develop rights and privileges under the Alaska constitution instead of merely relying on the pronouncements of the United
States Supreme Court. To fulfill its responsibilities, the court rejected
the majority position in Williams and declared that it was "not bound
to follow blindly a federal constitutional construction of a fundamental principle if [it was] convinced that the result is based on unsound
reason or logic." 15s 3 The Alaska Supreme Court then accepted the reasoning articulated by Justice Black in his Williams dissent. Justice
Black had characterized the majority's decision as "a radical and danCal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970), the California Supreme Court
had retreated from the position it had taken in Jones.
147. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 84. For a good criticism of the Williams decision, see Blumenson, ConstitutionalLimitson ProsecutorialDiscovery, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 123 (1983).
150. Scott, 519 P.2d at 782.
151. The Scott court noted that "[a]lmost without exception provisions of this type
have been upheld. Some of the decisions would seem to apply notice-of-alibi provisions without discussing the constitutional considerations. Still other decisions do not
extensively discuss or analyze the constitutional problems but subordinate the issue to
matters of procedure." Id. (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 783 (discussing Sikora v. District Court, 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897

(1969)).
153. Id.
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gerous departure from the historical and constitutionally guaranteed
right of a defendant in a criminal case to remain completely silent,
requiring the State to prove its case without any assistance of any kind
154
from the defendant himself."'
The Scott court principally objected to Williams on the ground
that it upset the appropriate adversarial balance in the criminal proceedings.' 55 In this regard, the court criticized two rationales advanced in support of broad prosecutorial discovery: (1) the "timing"
157
rationale, 5 6 and (2) the "two-way street" rationale.
The "timing" and the "two-way street" rationales were first articulated by Justice Traynor in Jones v. Superior Court. 58 Under the
"timing" rationale, any information that a defendant will necessarily
disclose at trial, may be the subject of a compulsory pretrial discovery
order. 159 Proponents of this rationale posit that such an order merely
accelerates the timing of the disclosure in order to increase the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. 160 According to the "two-way
street" rationale, a defendant has no valid interest in denying pretrial
access to pertinent information absent the proper invocation of a privilege provided by law. 16 1 Supporters of this view argue that if defendants are to be permitted to discover evidence in the hands of the
prosecutor despite the fact that such discovery is not constitutionally
mandated, the prosecutor ought to be granted the same right. Only
162
then will the orderly ascertainment of the truth be facilitated.
The Williams Court relied on the "timing" rationale. But for the
difference in timing, the Williams majority equated the defendant's attrial choice of whether to reveal potentially incriminating information
and forego the opportunity to present a defense with the parallel
choice before trial.' 63 The Scott court, however, believed that more
than mere timing was at stake in such cases:
[B]ecause of the prosecutor's heavy burden of proof, the defendant
is best advised not to open up any source of potentially adverse information unless he feels that the state has in all likelihood proved
154. Id. at 781-82 (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 107-08 (Black, J., dissenting)).
155. See Id. at 784.
156. See id. at 783-84.
157. See id. at 784-85.
158. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
159. See id. at 61, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882; Developments, Prosecution
Entitled to Know Identity of Defendant's Witnesses and Discover Documents to Be Introduced in Support of Affirmative Defense, 63 COLUM. L. Rev. 361, 364-65 (1963).
160. See, e.g., Williams, 399 U.S. at 85; Jones, 58 Cal. 2d at 62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22
Cal. Rptr. at 882.
161. See Jones, 58 Cal. 2d at 59-60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881, Developments, supra note 159, at 364-65.
162. See Jones, 58 Cal. 2d at 59-60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
163. Williams, 399 U.S. at 84-85.
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its case; and it is only after the prosecutor has presented his evidence in court that the defendant can adequately make this judgment. By contrast, there is no way the defendant can know before
trial the actual strength of the evidence against him as it will appear
to the trier of fact, even if he has himself benefitted from extensive
discovery; witnesses' testimony under oath and cross-examination
may radically depart from their versions of164the events as given to
the police or defense counsel prior to trial.
Like the Williams Court, the Scott court recognized the value of
avoiding surprise to the prosecution. 165 The Scott court impliedly acknowledged that surprise often leads to a stay in the trial for
prosecutorial discovery and thereby decreases the efficiency of the law
enforcement process. 166 It stated in response, however, that "the appropriate constitutional analysis is not the mere balancing of the
state's interest in facilitating efficient law enforcement with the interest
of the citizenry in maintaining maximum liberty." 167 To this effect,

the court quoted Justice Black's dissent in Williams:
A criminal trial is in part a search for truth. But it is also a system
designed to protect "freedom" by insuring that no one is criminally
punished unless the State has first succeeded in the admittedly difficult task of convincing a jury that the defendant is guilty. The task
is made more difficult by the Bill of Rights, and the Fifth Amendment may be one of the most difficult of the barriers to surmount.
The Framers decided that the benefits to be derived from the kind of
were well worth any loss in "effitrial required by the Bill
1 68 of Rights
ciency" that resulted.
While the Williams Court did not rely upon the "two-way street"
rationale, the frequency with which other courts and commentators
discussed this rationale prompted the Scott court to address it. 169 The
Scott court found the "two-way street" rationale unpersuasive in criminal cases for two very important reasons. First, in criminal proceedings, the investigative resources of the state typically substantially
exceed those of the accused. 1 70 Second, the accused possesses a
the state
while
constitutional right to stand silent in criminal cases 17
1
attempts to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
In considering whether a particular portion of the compelled disclosure order undermined the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the Scott court applied the following three-part test to each
164. Scott, 519 P.2d at 784 (quoting Note, ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposed
Rule 16, 85 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1007-08 (1972) (footnote omitted)).

165. Id. at 783.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 784.
168. Id. (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 113-14 (Black, J., dissenting)).

169. Id. at 780.
170. Id. at 784.
171. Id. at 784-85.
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portion of the order: (1) was the evidence sought testimonial; (2) was
the evidence potentially incriminating; and (3) was the disclosure of
the evidence compelled.1 72 Under this test, the court approved only
that portion of the order requiring the defendant to give notice of intent to assert an alibi defense. The remaining portions of the order
73
were labelled unconstitutional.
Because the compulsion of testimony under a grant of immunity
obviously involves compulsion and testimony, only the "incriminating" branch of the Scott test requires examination in the context of
testimonial immunity. In this regard, it is important to note that the
Scott court took an extremely broad view of the types of harm to the
defendant that it would consider "incriminating." The court concluded that disclosure of certain information not in and of itself incriminating can lead to an incriminating result. 74
Using this broad approach, the court held that to require the defense to produce a witness list may in some instances tend to be incriminating. The court stated:
Although the list might not appear to be incriminating on its face,
certain of the persons identified in such a list may be known felons,
perjurers, accomplices, codefendants, or individuals under suspicion
or police surveillance. Moreover, the police may possess additional
incriminating information about some of the witnesses and an accused's reference to such persons may tend to arouse suspicion
about his relationship with the witness or may
tend to implicate him
75
in the criminal activities of such witness.'
The court also found that requiring the defendant to disclose written
or recorded statements of prospective defense or government witnesses
would violate the privilege, since it was not "inconceivable" that some
portion of the statements might be incriminating.
For example, if a defendant in a murder case intended to call witness A to testify that defendant killed in self-defense, pre-trial disclosure of that information could provide the prosecution with its
sole eyewitness to defendant's homicide. Similarly, consider the effect of disclosing the name or expected testimony of witness B,
whom defendant intends to call only as a "last resort" 76to testify that
defendant only committed a lesser-included offense.1
Finally, the Scott court found that compelled disclosure of the location
of an alibi ran afoul of the privilege, since such information could influence the preparation of the prosecution's case. A pretrial disclosure
of the location where the defendant claims to have been at the time the
172. Id. at 785.
173. Id. at 785-87.
174. Id. at 785.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 786 (quoting Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 323, 466
P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1970)).

19861

USE AND DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY

offense was committed, whether made in the course of discovery as in
Scott, or in the course of compelled immunized testimony, will certainly lead the prosecution to investigate that location. It may also
lead to witnesses able to provide the police with information that
177
might not have been discovered but for the compelled disclosure.
The Scott decision reflects the Alaska Supreme Court's determination that the privilege against self-incrimination provided by article
I, section 9, of the Alaska Constitution is broader than that afforded
by the United States Constitution. It indicates that the court firmly
refuses "to exchange a fundamental constitutional right for expediency," 178 requiring instead that the prosecution live within the bounds
placed upon it by traditional American jurisprudence. 179 Just as the
Alaska Supreme Court in Scott stood fast against a trend towards
making criminal discovery a two-way street, it should stand firm
against major change in the prosecutorial and defense roles permitted
by the new use and derivative use immunity statute.
The Scott court's broad approach to what is "incriminating" in
the context of criminal discovery should be applied in the context of
compelled immunized testimony. While use and derivative use immunity theoretically protects a witness from incrimination, the practical
effect of the disclosure of self-incriminatory facts must be considered.
The court in Scott refused to ignore even those very indirect and remotely incriminating results of disclosures by the defendant. When
faced with the issue of whether use and derivative use immunity actually removes the "incriminating" element of compelled testimony, the
court should take as skeptical an approach.
3. Interpretingthe Alaska ConstitutionalPrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination to Require TransactionalImmunity is Consistent with the
Intent of the Drafters of the Alaska Constitution. For historical
reasons, it is clear that interpreting the Alaska constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination to require transactional immunity is consistent with the intent of the drafters of the Alaska Constitution. Adhering to the intent of the drafters of the Hawaii Constitution is one of the
reasons that Hawaii, granted statehood the same year as Alaska, has
rejected the Kastigar rule. 180
177. Id. at 787.
178. Id.
179. A comparison between the Alaska criminal discovery rule and the federal
criminal discovery rule reveals the same difference in approach. The Alaska rule, as
consistently applied by the state appellate courts, provides for broad discovery of information in the possession of the prosecution, and does not make that discovery contingent on reciprocal discovery provided by the defendant to the prosecution.
Compare ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16 with FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
180. See State v. Miyasaki, 62 Haw. 269, 614 P.2d 915 (1980).
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In State v. Miyasaki,181 the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected a use
and derivative use immunity statute 182 as unconstitutional under the
Hawaii Constitution. 183 The prosecution sought to compel the testimony of a witness granted use and derivative use immunity pursuant
to the statute. The defendant contended that the statute was constitutionally invalid because it was not coterminous with the privilege
against self-incrimination bestowed by the Hawaii Constitution. The
Hawaii Supreme Court agreed. After reviewing the history of case
precedents from Counselman to Kastigar,the Hawaii Supreme Court
concluded that it was "irrefutable" that "transactional immunity was
'part of [the United States'] constitutional fabric,' " almost without
question until Kastigar.184 In construing the self-incrimination clause
of Hawaii's constitution, the Miyasaki court attempted to "give effect
to the intention of the framers and the people adopting [the state constitution]." 18 5 Thus, the court analyzed:
Here, the definitive interpretation on the Fifth Amendment and immunity, announced in Brown v. Walker and followed without question for more than seven decades, prevailing when the Hawaii
Constitution was drafted and adopted lends substantial support for
a conclusion that the statutory protection afforded by HRS § 621C3 is inadequate to terminate the constitutionally endowed privilege
against self-incrimination. . . . That transactionalimmunity had
been "part of our constitutional fabric" from 1893 could not have
been lost to a convention that included lawyers among its members.
Nor can we conclude the sanguine statements about the Fifth
Amendment and interpretations strongly favoring the privilege may
have escaped the members of a constitutional convention convened
in 1950. Transactional immunity is undoubtedly part of the
"fabric" of Article I, Section 10 [sic], notwithstanding the tear in
the "fabric" of the Federal Constitution caused by Kastigar and
Zicarelli 186

The decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Miyasaki is of particular importance in predicting Alaska's ultimate resolution of this
issue since Hawaii and Alaska adopted and ratified their state constitutions virtually contemporaneously. The Alaska Constitution's selfincrimination provision, like its Hawaii counterpart, was enacted at a
181. Id.
182. HAW. REV. STAT. § 621C-3 (1971) (standard Kastigaruse and derivative use

immunity statute).
183. The privilege against self-incrimination is found in HAW. CONST. art I, § 8.
184. Miyasaki, 62 Haw. at 278, 614 P.2d at 921.
185. Id. at 281, 614 P.2d at 922 (quoting HGEA v. County of Maui, 59 Haw. 65,
80-81, 576 P.2d 1029, 1039 (1978)).

186. Id. at 282, 614 P.2d at 922-23 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (reference to article I, section 10 should be article I, section 8). In Zicarelli v. New Jersey
State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), a companion case to Kastigar,
the Court upheld a New Jersey use and derivative use immunity statute.
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time when the insufficiency of use and derivative use immunity had
been part of the federal "constitutional fabric" for decades. The
Alaska constitutional framers, like those in Hawaii, included lawyers
mindful of the constitutional limitations on immunity and self-incrimination then in effect. It was the 1958 view, embodied in the decisions
of Counselman and Brown, that necessarily influenced the Alaska constitutional framers. 18 7 No other view existed at the time and nothing
in the preceding decades of case law would have predicted the Kastigar analysis. The fact that all of the immunity statutes passed by the
Alaska Territorial Legislature before and during the drafting of the
state constitution provided for full transactional immunity1 88 reinforces the conclusion that, in the minds of the state constitution's
drafters, only transactional immunity could supplant the privilege
against self-incrimination.
4. The Alaska ConstitutionalRight to Privacy. The federal constitution protects the right to privacy through a broad reading of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, or through "emanations"
from other constitutional provisions. In contrast, the right to privacy
in Alaska is guaranteed by an explicit constitutional provision. 189 Article I, section 22, of the Alaska Constitution provides, in part:
Right of Privacy. The right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed.
The state right to privacy has consistently been held to exceed that
guaranteed under the federal constitution. 190 The additional protection afforded by this section of the Alaska Constitution is taken quite
seriously. For instance, this provision protects the right of adults to
possess marijuana at home for personal use. 19 1 The right of privacy
has also been applied so as to amplify the effect of other constitutional
rights directed towards the protection of privacy. For instance, the
Alaska constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures is considered broader in scope than fourth amendment guarantees under the federal constitution, in part because of the broad
Alaska constitutional right to privacy. 192 In accordance with this approach, the Alaska Constitution, unlike the federal constitution, pro187. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
189. Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977). For a
discussion of the Alaska right to privacy, see Note, Alaska's Right to Privacy Ten
Years After Ravin v. State: Developing a Jurisprudenceof Privacy, 2 ALASKA L. REV.

159 (1985).
190. State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1979); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872
(Alaska 1978); Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977).
191. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 495 (Alaska 1975).
192. Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 734 (Alaska 1979).
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hibits warrantless administrative inspections of private business
premises. 93 The warrantless monitoring of private conversations on
the consent of one participant, acceptable under federal constitutional
standards, constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to
the combined effect of the Alaska constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Alaska constitutional
194
right of privacy.
The privilege against self-incrimination reflects "our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.' "195 Just
as the Alaska constitutional right to privacy has been applied to am-

plify the effect of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures, it may be applied to further support a broader application of

the privilege against self-incrimination than is utilized in the federal
system.
B.

The Immunity Statute Was Enacted in Violation of the Alaska
Constitution's Grant of Rule-Making Authority to the
Supreme Court

Taken together, the Alaska Constitution, 19 6 the Alaska Rules of
Court Procedure and Administration, 97 the Uniform Rules of the
Alaska Legislature, 198 and Alaska decisional law' 99 provide that a leg193. Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977).
194. Coffey v. State, 585 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1978); Aldridge v. State, 584 P.2d 1105
(Alaska 1978); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
195. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting United
States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd,
353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
196. ALASKA CONsT. art. IV, § 15 provides in full:
The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts. It shall make and promulgate rules governing practice
and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all courts. These rules may be
changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each
house.
197. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 93 provides:
These rules are promulgated pursuant to constitutional authority granting rule making power to the supreme court, and to the extent that they are
inconsistent with any procedural provisions of any statute not enacted for
the specific purpose of changing a rule, shall supersede such statute to the
extent of such inconsistency.
198. UNIF. R. ALASKA LEGIS. 39(e) provides:
If a bill or portion of a bill contains matter changing a supreme court
rule governing practice and procedure in civil or criminal cases, the bill must
contain a section expressly citing the rule and noting what change is being
proposed. The section containing the change in a court rule must be approved by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the full membership of each
house. If the section effecting a change in the court rule fails to receive the
required two-thirds vote, the section is void and without effect and is deleted
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islative enactment cannot override a preexisting Alaska Supreme
Court rule unless (1) the legislature specifically identified the enactment as changing the court rule, (2) the enactment was subjected to a
separate vote, and (3) the enactment was approved by a two-thirds
majority in both houses of the legislature.
Although the Alaska Supreme Court had not technically enacted
a numbered rule requiring transactional immunity when the legislature passed the use and derivative use immunity statute at issue, the
court had effectively done so. In State v. Serdahely,2 00 the supreme
court explicitly adopted transactional immunity as a "rule of practice"20 1 after carefully considering those policies and procedures that
Alaska should follow. This "rule of practice" was adopted by a unanimous court202 pursuant to the vote gathering process ordinarily followed for the promulgation of civil and criminal rules. For all intents
and purposes, the "rule of practice" requiring transactional immunity
constituted a "Rule of Court." There is no logical or practical distinction between enacting a rule of practice or procedure by a process of
codification (insertion of the rule in the volumes of the Rules of Court)
or by a process of decisional law. The legislature was constitutionally
required to adhere to the requirements for overriding a supreme court
rule in its passage of the use and derivative use immunity statute.
The Alaska Legislature failed to meet any of the strictures imposed by the Alaska Constitution, Alaska Rules of Court, the Uniform
Rules of the Alaska Legislature, and Alaska decisional law in enacting
the use immunity statute. The provision was not singled out for
separate consideration, 20 3 was not identified as causing a change in
court rules, 2° 4 and was not approved by a two-thirds majority in each
house of the legislature. 20 5 The manner in which the legislature enfrom the bill. The fact that a bill contains a section which changes a court
rule shall also be noted in the title of the bill.
199. See Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447, 451 (Alaska 1963) (required that the enactment specifically state that its purpose is to effect a change in court rules).
200. 635 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1981).
201. Id.
202. With the exception of the addition of Justice Allen Compton to and the deletion of Justice Roger Connor from the supreme court bench, the Alaska Supreme
Court is composed today of the same members as the court that decided Serdahely.
The likelihood of Justice Compton concurring with the court's preference for transactional immunity may be fairly assumed from his decision, as a superior court judge, in
State v. Compton, 629 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1981). As a result, there is little basis to
conclude that a rule on immunity adopted by the court today would be anything other
than a codification of the rule adopted in Serdahely.
203. See 1982 ALASKA HOUSE J. at 2315-16. See also letter from Governor Jay
Hammond to Senate President Jalmar Kerttula, 1982 ALASKA SENATE J. at 1787-88
(July 22, 1982).
204. See 1982 ALASKA HOUSE J. at 2314-15; 1982 ALASKA SENATE J. at 1704.
205. The provision passed in the house by a vote of 22-17-01, 1982 ALASKA
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acted the statute thus renders it inadequate to override the supreme
court's adoption in Serdahely
of transactional immunity as a "rule of
20 6
practice" in Alaska.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If the Alaska Legislature fails to cure the defects that plague the
use and derivative use immunity statute, it is likely that the Alaska
Supreme Court will ultimately hold the statute invalid. Having expressed a strong and unanimous preference for transactional immunity
as a matter of judicial policy, it seems unlikely that the court will defer
to a legislative determination that fails to comport with the procedural
requirements of the Alaska Constitution, the Rules of Court, and the
Uniform Rules of the Alaska Legislature.
Even if the legislature cures the procedural problems associated
with the use and derivative use immunity statute, it appears likely that
the Alaska Supreme Court will ultimately reject the statute when unavoidably faced with the issue of the constitutionality of use and derivative use immunity. Kastigarrepresents an anomaly in the case law.
The Kastigar analysis conflicts with the view of the breadth of the
Alaska Constitution's protection from self-incrimination expressed in
Scott v. State,2 07 and with the view of immunity expressed in State v.
Serdahely,20 8 Surina v. Buckalew, 20 9 and McCracken v. Corey.2 10 Perhaps most importantly, Kastigaris inconsistent with the concept of the
privilege against self-incrimination in the minds of the framers of the
Alaska Constitution.
The objection of prosecutors to affording transactional immunity
to witnesses is rooted in the belief that transactional immunity potenHOUSE J. at 2314-15,

and in the senate by a vote of 13-06-01, 1982 ALASKA

SENATE J.

at 1704.
206. At least three Superior Court Judges have addressed the constitutionality of
ALASKA STAT. § 12.50.01. Superior Court Judge Charles K. Cranston upheld the
statute against a challenge based on the rule making powers of the supreme court.
Judge Cranston concluded that the Serdahely court relied upon its supervisory powers, not its constitutional rule making authority, in adopting transactional immunity.
State v. Buttacavoli, 3KN 585-1358 (Opinion of Judge Charles K. Cranston, Nov. 15,
1985) (unpublished). Superior Court Judge Rene J. Gonzalez reached the opposite
conclusion in State v. Gearhart, 3AN S85-7469 Cr. at 5-7 (transcript of Trial by Jury,
Aug. 14, 1986). Most recently, Superior Court Judge Mary E. Greene found that only
transactional immunity would be sufficient to satisfy the Alaska constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Judge Greene did not, however, address the procedural argument. State v. Mackay, 3AN S85-7630 Cr. (Opinion of Judge Mary E.
Greene, Sept. 22, 1986).
207. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
208. 635 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1981).
209. 629 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1981).
210. 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska 1980).
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tially requires the state to elect between defendants and to set one or
more of them free. Prosecutors advance the argument that the court
should balance the privilege against self-accusation with the state's
perceived need or desire to prosecute all persons for all things. There
are several disturbing elements to this view. First, such a contention
presumes the guilt, rather than the innocence, of individuals. Second,
the contention mistakenly assumes that a goal of prosecution and conviction pervades American jurisprudence. It does not. Paramount in
our system of justice are those rights secured and guaranteed by the
Constitution, not the prosecution of wrongdoing. It would be easy to
cast a net so broad as to ensnare all persons guilty of all wrongdoing.
Unfortunately, when the net is cast so broadly, it inevitably ensnares
the innocent as well as the guilty.
While the majority decision in Kastigar may have been a disappointment to the dissenting justices, the result should not have been
surprising in light of the reconstruction of the United States Supreme
Court which occurred subsequent to 1968.211 It is difficult to avoid
the conclusion, however, that Kastigar is "against" the weight and
alignment of history and precedents on the issue of the scope of the
fifth amendment privilege and the scope of immunity necessary to supplant the privilege. The Alaska Supreme Court will likely elect to
keep alive and vital the views of Kastigar's dissenters, and to align
itself with Hawaii, Oregon, Massachusetts, and the years of case law
that preceded Kastigar by rejecting, on state constitutional grounds,
Alaska's use and derivative use immunity statute.

211. See Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 121.

